Abstract-Given that wireless communication occurs in a shared and inherently broadcast medium, the transmissions are vulnerable to undesired eavesdropping. This occurs even when a point-to-point communication is sought, and hence a fundamental question is whether we can utilize the wireless channel properties to establish secrecy. In this paper we consider secret communication between two special nodes ("source" and "destination") in a wireless network with authenticated relays: the message communicated to the destination is to be kept information-theoretically (unconditionally) secret from any eavesdropper within a class. Since the transmissions are broadcast and interfere with each other, complex signal interactions occur. We develop cooperative schemes which utilize these interactions in wireless communication over networks with arbitrary topology, and give provable unconditional secrecy guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental aspect of wireless communication is its broadcast nature, i.e., transmission from a node can be overheard (albeit through different channels) at several locations. This property makes wireless communication inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping by an adversary. As the use of wireless networks grows, this would be an important concern to be addressed. This issue has been identified by recent discoveries that the wireless 802.11 networks are vulnerable to eavesdropping [4] . Therefore, a fundamental question is how to ensure secrecy in wireless communication.
To ask this question we first need to address the notion of secrecy that we seek. In 1949, Shannon introduced the notion of information theoretic secrecy [16] , in which he studied whether communication from a source to a destination can be kept secret from an eavesdropper, who has complete access to the transmission, without any assumptions on computational capabilities. As one would expect, such a question resulted in the pessimistic answer that unless the source and destination had somehow a large amount of shared common randomness (key) kept secret from the eavesdropper, the task was impossible. In fact, the shared common randomness needed was essentially of the same rate as the source message itself, making it essentially impractical. This observation led to the computational approach pioneered by Diffie and Hellman [8] , where instead of having such a long shared secret key, a shorter key is exploded into a larger one. The goal of the design is to guarantee that there is no efficient algorithm for the eavesdropper to discover the information transmitted. For example, the security of the well-known RSA publickey cryptosystem [15] is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers, and other cryptographic protocols are based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over groups.
Both these protocols are based on the (as of yet) unproven computational intractability hypothesis for these algorithmic problems.
Clearly the secrecy of any system can be enhanced if one could have even a small amount of shared key between the source-destination pair, which can be kept unconditionally secret from an eavesdropper 1 . In particular one of our motivations for the formulation in this paper is that we can potentially generate such a secret key using physical wireless channel properties. Such a functionality can be incrementally deployed in networks by passing this secret key to the higher layers in the network protocol stack where it could then be used to enhance secrecy. In this respect, the two approaches to secrecy can be complementary, with the information-theoretic secrecy used to provide further secrecy opportunities. Of course, in order to make this more practical, we need to utilize some distinguishing property between the destination and the eavesdropper in order to provide secrecy. In this paper, we study this problem for a wireless network, where a source node is transmitting to a destination node, with the help of (authenticated) relay nodes, when an unknown (passive) eavesdropper is also present in the network. We call this setup cooperative secrecy, since the (authenticated) nodes in the network cooperate to provide secrecy against potential eavesdroppers.
In wireless communication, even though the signal from the source is broadcast, it is received at the destination and the potential eavesdropper through different (fading) channels. It is this distinction that is exploited in information-theoretic secrecy for broadcast channels in the seminal work of wiretap channels [21] , [6] . However, not much is known about the cooperative secrecy setup, where there are relay nodes facilitating secure communication between a source and a destination 2 . To the best of our knowledge, our work here is the first to examine this problem for an arbitrary wireless network and provide provable secrecy guarantees. The main difficulties in dealing with arbitrary relay networks are (i) the broadcast nature of wireless communications, (ii) the fact that signals from simultaneously transmitting nodes interfere with one another at other nodes. These give rise to complex signal interactions making the understanding of wireless networks 1 Another motivation to study information-theoretic (or unconditional) secrecy might be that theoretically, quantum computers could make difficult algorithmic problems tractable [17] . 2 Notable exceptions are some recent studies of techniques when there is a single relay node present, as an extension of the classical relay channel to the secrecy problem [11] , [10] .
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978-1-4244-3513-5/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEEdifficult. Though there has been some recent understanding in terms of scaling laws for asymptotically large wireless networks [9] , [22] , [12] , there has not been a complete understanding of communication for the non-asymptotic regime. Our work develops on the recent understanding of wireless network information flow in [2] , [3] , which (approximately) characterized the unicast (or multicast) capacity without secrecy constraints. Our formulation asks a natural question of additionally keeping such a cooperative communication secure against a class of potential eavesdroppers.
The main result of our paper is an achievable trade-off between the reliable transmission rate from the source to the legitimate destination and the amount of information leaked to an eavesdropper over an arbitrary wireless relay network. We assume that the exact location of the eavesdropper is unknown, and therefore there is a class of potential eavesdroppers. Roughly speaking, the trade-off is related to the informationtheoretic min-cuts 3 between the source-destination and sourceeavesdropper pairs. In particular, one extreme point of the trade-off is that we can ensure perfect secrecy (zero rate of information leakage to the eavesdropper) for an information rate of (approximately) the "difference" between these two min-cut values. The other extreme point is to transmit information to the legitimate destination at its min-cut while leaking an information rate related to the "difference" between these two min-cut values to the eavesdropper. The precise statements and implications of our results are given in Section IV. We also propose a noise insertion strategy by the authenticated nodes in the network, which help the legitimate receiver for secure communication. In this paper, we only illustrate the noise insertion ideas through an example. In [14] we study this in more generality. We illustrate many of the ideas in this paper through a deterministic model for wireless networks proposed in [1] , [2] . The main results are proved for arbitrary wireless networks for both deterministic as well as noisy signal interaction models. These models are described more precisely in Section II.
The paper is organized as follows. We give the precise problem statement and motivate the wireless network models studied in this paper in Section II. We give a series of examples in Section III to illustrate some of the ideas in this paper. We state the main results in Section IV and discuss some of their implications. We sketch the overall proof in Section V, while the details are made available in a technical report [13] that can be found online. We conclude in Section VI with a discussion about possible extensions and open questions raised by this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider transmission over a wireless relay network G = (V, L), where V is the set of vertices representing the communication nodes in the relay network and L is the set of annotated channels between the nodes, which describe the signal interactions. Note that these channels are not point-topoint links, rather, they model how the transmitted signals are superimposed and received at the receiving nodes (i.e., there is broadcast and interference). We consider a special node S ∈ V as the source of the message which wants to securely communicate to another special node D ∈ V (the destination) with the help of a set of (authenticated) relay nodes A ⊂ V in the network. The secrecy is with respect to a set of possible (passive) eavesdropper nodes E ⊂ V where E is disjoint from A ∪ {S, D}. We want to keep all or part of the message secret if any one of the possible eavesdropper nodes E ∈ E listens to the wireless transmissions in the relay network 4 . Note that the class of eavesdroppers that we define is discrete, i.e., we assume that all possible eavesdroppers and their channels can be enumerated. If there is a continuum of possible eavesdropper channels, our model can approximate this via "quantization" of this continuum.
Wireless interaction model: In this well-accepted model [19] , transmitted signals get attenuated by (complex) gains to which independent (Gaussian) receiver noise is added. More formally, the received signal y j at node j ∈ V at time t is given by,
where h ij is the complex channel gain between node i and j which is the annotation of the channels in L, x i is the signal transmitted by node i, and N j are the set of nodes that have non-zero channel gains to j. We assume that the average transmit power constraints for all nodes is 1 and the additive receiver Gaussian noise is of unit variance. We use the terminology Gaussian wireless network when the signal interaction model is governed by (1).
Deterministic interaction model:
In [1] , a simpler deterministic model which captures the essence of wireless interaction was developed. The advantage of this model is its simplicity, which gives insight to strategies for the noisy wireless network model in (1). We will utilize this model in Section III to develop intuition for the wireless network secrecy problem, by giving illustrative examples for this model. Our main results are developed for both this deterministic model as well as the model in (1) . The deterministic model of [1] simplifies the wireless interaction model in (1) by eliminating the noise and discretizing the channel gains through a binary expansion of q bits. Therefore, the received signal y
which is a binary vector of size q is modeled as
where G ij is a q × q binary matrix representing the (discretized) channel transformation between nodes i and j and x
is the (discretized) transmitted signal. All operations in (2) are done over the binary field. We use the terminology deterministic wireless network when the signal interaction model is governed by (2) . An illustration of this deterministic model is given in Figure 1 for the broadcast and multiple access networks. Figure 1 (a) shows a deterministic model of the broadcast channel, where the channel from the transmitter to Receiver 1 is stronger than that to Receiver 2. This is represented by the deterministic model developed in [1] with 5 most significant bits (MSB) of the transmitted signal captured by Rx 1 and only 2 MSB of the transmitted signal captured by Rx 2. The deterministic model of the multiple access channel shown in Figure 1 (b) adds one more ingredient, which is how the bits from two transmitting nodes interact at a receiver.
In Figure 1 (b) the channel from Tx 1 to Rx is stronger than that of Tx 2. Therefore, the interaction is between the 2 MSBs of Tx 2 with the lower significant bits of Tx 1, and the interaction is modeled with an addition over the binary field (i.e., xor). This interaction captures the dynamic range of the signal interactions. It was shown in [1] , that this model approximately 5 captures the wireless interaction model of (1) for the broadcast and multiple access channels. For general networks the deterministic model yields insights which, when translated to the noisy wireless network, lead one to develop cooperative strategies for the model in (1), which are (provably) approximately 6 optimal [3] . Given the relay network with the above signal interaction models given in (1) and (2), we want to ensure that we can communicate reliably and secretly between S and D. The notion of reliability is the standard information-theoretic notion that the destination can decode the source message of rate R with arbitrarily small probability of error. More formally:
Definition 1: A (T, )-code is given by a (possibly) probabilistic source encoding function f S mapping W to X S , a set of deterministic relay encoding functions f i , mapping Y i to X i at each relay i ∈ A, and a deterministic decoding function f D , mapping Y D into an estimateŴ of the message. Here,
) and Y i are blocks of T symbols (each symbol being a real or complex number or a binary vector), and W is the information message, which is uniformly distributed in the set {1, . . . , 2 T R }. The quantity R is the rate of the code. The probability of error of a (T, )-code is required to be bounded by : P(W =Ŵ ) < .
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy is defined through the equivocation rate R e , which is the residual uncertainty about the message when the observation of the strongest eavesdropper is given. More formally, [21] , [6] :
Definition 2: Given a (T, )-code, the equivocation rate is
where W is the uniformly distributed source message, Y E is the sequence of observations at eavesdropper E and H(·|·) denotes the (conditional) entropy [18] . In this paper, we also refer to the equivocation rate as simply the "equivocation".
Definition 3: A rate-equivocation pair (R, R e ) is called "achievable" if for any > 0, there exists a blocklength T and a (T, )-code of rate R and equivocation R e .
By "perfect secrecy", we mean a situation where a rateequivocation pair (R, R e ) such that R = R e is achievable. If we are only interested in such cases, we can use the following quantity:
Definition 4: The perfect secrecy rate R s of a network is defined as R s max{R : (R, R) is achievable}.
III. EXAMPLES
Through the examples in this section we seek to illustrate the following ideas: The operation of the relays to set up cooperation in a (i) non-layered and (ii) layered network; (iii) Handling of a class of potential eavesdroppers; (iv) A noise insertion/jamming scheme by relays to help secrecy. Note that in the first three examples, noise insertion by the relays would also improve the rate-equivocation tradeoff. However, since our main results do not use noise insertion, we decided to show this positive effect only in the last example as a motivation for future work. All four examples are based on the deterministic wireless network model developed in [1] . Though the examples illustrate these ideas, proving the performance of a scheme for general networks in Section IV needs methods that are technically more difficult. These are sketched in Section V and in the appendix of [13] . 
A. Deterministic examples

Example 1:
Consider the deterministic wireless network in Figure 2 with a source S, a relay R and destination D which wants secrecy from an eavesdropper E. Note that this network is not layered 7 . This means that the information is received by D and E over multiple times, like in inter-symbol interference. It is clear that the maximum communication rate (with no concern for secrecy) between the source and the destination is 3 bits. As the channel from the source to the eavesdropper E is as strong as that to the destination, we cannot ensure any secrecy in the absence of a relay [6] . Therefore, the cooperation of the relay is crucial to ensure secrecy. Suppose the source transmits bits (
where the symbols are delayed because the relay needs to first hear the incoming signal before transmitting. This is a consequence of the non-layered structure of the network. The mixing at the destination (and at the eavesdropper) is therefore of bits transmitted at different times by the source. This is the reason for the time index notion in this example. Assume that the transmission takes place over T + 1 timeslots, but S only transmits during the first T timeslots and therefore sends 3T bits over T + 1 timeslots, resulting in a rate of 3T T +1 → 3 bits per timeslot. R transmits information during timeslots 2 through T + 1. At the end of timeslot t, we have the received signals
At time 1, R does not transmit anything yet, and the destination receives (0, , t = 1, . . . , T , because it never receives any information related to these bits. Thus, the scheme described here achieves (R, R e ) = (3, 1), and hence ensures 1 bit of secrecy. Example 2: We now study a larger deterministic wireless network with A = {A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 }. The network is shown in Figure 3 . Note that this network is layered, and so are all the subsequent examples. The information-theoretic cutset from S to D is 2 bits. This example illustrates that the relays do not have to decode the source message to ensure secure and reliable communication. 0, 0, 0) , and E 2 receives (0, 0, 0, W 1 ) or (0, 0, 0, 0). In either case, we only achieve (R, R e ) = (3, 2) bits. Some additional thought also reveals that it is not possible to make R e larger than 2 when E 1 and E 2 can both be present (provided that the relay nodes are not allowed to use noise insertion, i.e., their encoding functions must be deterministic). We thus see the tension created by the uncertainty about the eavesdropper. 8 Those who are familiar with secure network coding [5] might notice some connections with this example. However, in network coding, the communication is over a graph and hence the medium does not impose broadcast and interference, allowing for a larger range of strategies. In a wireless channel the broadcast and multiple access properties are imposed by nature, making the problem more difficult. Example 4: For the network given in Figure 5 , we introduce a new relaying strategy, where some of the authenticated relay nodes actively help secrecy by inserting random bits into the communication 9 . In a sense these relays are "jamming" the eavesdropper and helping secure communication. The cutset bound between (S, D) is 2 bits. Let the source send (W 1 , W 2 ) at its outgoing nodes. One strategy is that A sends (0, W 1 , 0), and B sends (W 2 ). In this case, D receives (0, W 1 , W 2 ), while E receives (0, 0, W 2 ), yielding (R, R e ) = (2, 1). Any strategy where the relay does not insert randomness cannot ensure more than 1 bit of secrecy. Now we allow A to generate a random bit b before every transmission. Then, it transmits (b, W 1 , 0). The transmitter at B remains unchanged. Now, D receives (b, W 1 , W 2 ). The eavesdropper E receives (0, 0, W 2 ⊕ b), and therefore we obtain perfect secrecy of 2 bits. This example illustrates that active noise insertion by the relays can enhance secrecy.
B. Gaussian example
In this section, we give an example of a scheme that achieves perfect secrecy in a Gaussian wireless network. Here, we do not allow the relay nodes to insert noise. Consider the diamond network shown in Figure 6 , which is defined as follows.
Definition 5: The Gaussian diamond network is a network with two relays A and B and one eavesdropper E, whose channels are given by the equations:
For simplicity assume that all channel gains are real, and that |h SA | > |h SB |. Equations (4) and (5) together describe a stochastically degraded Gaussian broadcast channel, while Fig. 6 . Gaussian diamond wireless network.
equations (6) and (7) each describe a Gaussian multiple-access channel.
For an arbitrary θ ∈ [0, 1], define the following two functions:
It is well known [18] as the region of all pairs (R A , R B ) satisfying
Note that R MAC k is the achievable rate-region of the multipleaccess channel from A and B to k, for k ∈ {D, E}. Now, we describe an achievable perfect secrecy rate for the Gaussian diamond network.
Theorem 1: In the Gaussian diamond network,
where the maximization is over all θ ∈ [0, 1] for which
and for which the set
is non-empty. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendixof [13] . Note that the Gaussian diamond network of Figure 6 is very closely related to the deterministic wireless network shown in Figure 5 . In fact, the noise insertion strategy in Example 4 can also be incorporated into the Gaussian case to enhance the secrecy. Moreover, all the deterministic examples given have Gaussian counterparts, and the strategies suggested by the deterministic examples can also be implemented in the Gaussian wireless model of (1). This is the connection in the insight that is used in the results presented in Section IV. However, for general networks, we need a strategy that works for any network, making the use of more sophisticated probabilistic methods outlined in Section V necessary.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we guarantee certain rate-equivocation regions for networks where the relay nodes are bound to use deterministic encoding functions (no noise insertion is allowed). First, we introduce the notion of an informationtheoretic min-cut in a network.
Definition 7: We denote by Λ i the set of all cutsets in the network that separate the source S from node i:
For a subset Ω ⊂ V, we denote by X Ω the tuple of all
is called the min-cut between the pair (S, i), where I(·; ·|·) is the (conditional) mutual information. Now, we state our two main results. Definition 9: Let a distribution p({x i } i∈V ) over all transmit alphabets be given. We define R(p) to be the set of all pairs (R, R e ) satisfying
Theorem 2:
In an arbitrary network with deterministic signal interaction as given in (2), all rate-equivocation pairs in the region R = ∪ i∈V p(xi) R(p) are achievable, where the union is taken over all possible product-distributions on the transmit alphabets.
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of codes for the region of rate-equivocation pairs R. However, this is not a complete characterization in that, we do not have a matching converse stating that no strategy can achieve pairs (R, R e ) that lie outside this region. Also note that the result in Theorem 2 can be generalized to include arbitrary deterministic interaction functions, rather than the linear model given in (2), by using techniques similar to those in [2] .
Corollary 1: In a network with deterministic signal interaction as given in (2), the perfect secrecy rate R s is lower bounded as follows:
H(YΩc |XΩc
Proof: From Theorem 2, whenever (R, R e ) ∈ R, so is (R e , R e ), and perfect secrecy at rate R e is possible. Corollary 1 then directly follows from Definition 4.
Definition 10: Let a distribution p({x i } i∈V ) over all transmit alphabets be given. We defineR(p) to be the set of all pairs (R, R e ) satisfying
where γ is a constant which depends on the topology of the network but not on the channel gains in L or the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) of operation.
Theorem 3: In a Gaussian wireless network, all rateequivocation pairs in the regioñ R = ∪ i∈V p(xi)R (p) are achievable, where the union is taken over all possible product-distributions on the transmit alphabets.
Remark 1: The rate-equivocation pairs developed in Examples 1 through 3 of Section III-A, can indeed be found by a direct application of Theorem 2. Therefore, we can use this result to find the performance for an arbitrary network with deterministic signal interactions. When computing the min-cut values for those examples, one should not forget to consider all possible input distributions i∈V p(x i ).
Remark 2: Note that since the gap γ is a constant and the rates given in Definition 10 can grow with the SNR, this gap can be made small with respect to the rates of operation. Therefore, even though there is a gap of γ bits in the bound on the equivocation in Theorem 3, it can be small with respect to the total rate, i.e., we might leak only a small number of bits for Gaussian wireless networks. However, we also believe that this gap is a purely technical issue in the proof, and not a fundamental problem arising in Gaussian wireless networks. Indeed, the diamond example given in Section III-B shows that perfect secrecy is possible in Gaussian networks.
V. PROOF OUTLINES
In this section, we outline the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, i.e., we prove the achievability of any (R, R e ) ∈ R(p) for the deterministic wireless network and the achievability of any (R, R e ) inR(p) for the Gaussian wireless network for any fixed product distribution p. The proof is sketched for the case when |E| = 2, i.e., there are only two eavesdroppers, denoted by E = {E 1 , E 2 }. The generalization to an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers is straightforward.
In both theorems, we claim the existence of a code that operates at rate R and achieves equivocation R e . It was shown in [2] that if there is no secrecy requirement, then a coding strategy for the deterministic wireless network is the following: The mapping f S is a mapping from {1, . . . , 2
T R } to a set of 2 T R sequences, where each sequence is X S -typical as defined in [7] . Similarly, the mapping f i at relay i ∈ A is a mapping from the set of all possible receive sequences to a subset of the X i -typical transmit sequences. For Gaussian wireless networks, there are infinitely many possible receive sequences y i , and thus, relay i first uses a quantizer to quantize Y i to a representation sequenceŶ i . Then, the mapping is applied toŶ i instead of Y i . The destination D declaresŵ if it is the unique member of {1, . . . , 2 T R } jointly typical with receive sequence Y D . In [2] , it is shown for deterministic wireless networks that if we select the mappings f S and f i , i ∈ A at random, and then use the randomly selected code, then the expected error probability is small as long as R < min Ω∈ΛD I(X Ω ; Y Ω c |X Ω c ) and the blocklength T is large enough. The expectation is taken over all random codes. Hence, it follows that there exists at least one code which has the desired error probability.
Note that although the existence of a good code is proved via a random coding argument, the selected code itself is deterministic. Now, we introduce the secrecy requirement. To guarantee secrecy, the source-encoder at S needs to be probabilistic. At the beginning of a block, when observing W , S will randomly generate two independent junk-messages J 1 and J 2 , which are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2 T B1 } and {1, . . . , 2 T B2 }, respectively. In the following, Lemma 1 states that if a code of this type satisfies certain conditions given in Definition 11, then the region of rate-equivocation pairs (19) and (20) is guaranteed to be achievable. The proof uses the fact that for such a code, each eavesdropper is forced to decode part of the junk (J 1 , J 2 ) before being able to decode W . Then, by making the rate of (J 1 , J 2 ) large enough, we can make it impossible for the eavesdroppers to decode W at all. Finally, Lemmas 4 and 5 state that such secrecy-codes actually exist for the networks we consider. Their proofs are via a random code construction similar to the one in [2] and [3] , respectively.
Definition 11: A network is called securable with information rate R D , junk rates R E1 , R E2 and gap Δ if for any 0 > 0 and for any (R, B 1 , B 2 ) such that
and
there exists a code that encodes a message triple (W,
} into blocks of length T , and which is such that
and 
w,j1 is the event that E 2 makes an error when decoding J 2 given that (W, J 1 ) = (w, j 1 ) and assuming that W and J 1 are available at E 2 .
Definition 11 is used in the following lemma, which gives an achievable rate-equivocation region for any securable network.
Lemma 1: If a network is securable with information rate R D , junk rates R E1 , R E2 and gap Δ, then all rate-equivocation pairs (R, R e ) that satisfy
are achievable.
Proof: Assume that a network is securable with information rate R D and junk rates R E1 and R E2 . Without loss of generality, assume that R E1 ≥ R E2 . Choose B 1 and B 2 as
and Before each transmission block, the source S generates junk messages (J 1 , J 2 ) with rates B 1 and B 2 . Assume that R = R D − R E1 . In fact, if R is smaller than this quantity, we artificially increase it by adding additional randomness. If R is larger than this quantity, then we communicate part of it through the junk messages. It follows that
The main results of this paper are consequences of the following two lemmas:
Lemma 4: Given a deterministic wireless network and a product distribution p on its transmit alphabets, the network is securable with gap Δ = 0 and the following information and junk rates: Lemma 5: Given a Gaussian wireless network and a product distribution p on its transmit alphabets, the network is securable with gap Δ = γ and the following information and junk rates: The proofs of Lemmas 2 through 5 can be found in the appendix of [13] .
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have formulated a communication scenario with secrecy requirement for wireless networks with cooperating relays which help to enhance the secrecy against an eavesdropper. The eavesdropper's wireless channel is not exactly known but only known to belong to a class. The way we generate secrecy uses the characteristic properties of the wireless channel: the eavesdropper's channel is statistically distinct from that of the destination and our schemes exploit this difference to set up cooperation mechanisms to provide secrecy. It is possible to interpret equivocation as secret key generation, and therefore we can use the techniques outlined in this paper to generate an unconditionally secure key. The translation of message secrecy to key-generation is as follows. Through proper coding, a part of the message of size equal to the equivocation can be kept secret from any eavesdropper, and thus play the role of a secret key that is communicated to the destination. It should be noted the rate-equivocation results presented in this paper are only achievability results, and not a complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region. To obtain such a characterization we need a matching converse stating that no scheme can do better, and this is part of further research. Even though through examples in Section III, we discussed insertion of noise by the relays, the results presented in Section IV are for deterministically operating relays. The study of noise-insertion strategies for general networks can be found in [14] .
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